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Boots on the Ground
a history of fort bascom in the canadian river valley
James Blackshear

I

n 1863 the Union Army in New Mexico Territory, prompted by fears of a
second Rebel invasion from Texas and its desire to check incursions by
southern Plains Indians, built Fort Bascom on the south bank of the Canadian
River. The U.S. Army placed the fort about eleven miles north of present-day
Tucumcari, New Mexico, a day’s ride from the western edge of the Llano
Estacado (see map 1). Fort Bascom operated as a permanent post from 1863
to 1870. From late 1870 through most of 1874, it functioned as an extension
of Fort Union, and served as a base of operations for patrols in New Mexico
and expeditions into Texas. Fort Bascom has garnered little scholarly interest
despite its historical significance. This investigation attempts to broaden the
scholarly understanding of the role Fort Bascom played in extending federal
power over the Southwest.1
Such a study involves examining the mid-nineteenth-century economic
relationships between southern Plains Indians and the mountain people
of New Mexico, the environment of the Canadian River Valley, and the
James Blackshear is a history PhD candidate at the University of North Texas in Denton. This
article is part of his dissertation research on Fort Bascom. He wishes to thank his wife Barbara for
her tireless support, encouragement, and companionship during this endeavor. The suggestions
of University of North Texas professors Richard B. McCaslin, F. Todd Smith, Duke Richey, and
G. L. Seligmann Jr. were all incorporated within the work. Durwood Ball’s encouragement and
insightful comments were incalculable. The author also acknowledges the important contributions of his two referees and wants to express what a pleasure it was to work with the New Mexico
Historical Review’s professional editorial staff. A special thanks also goes to Alexander Mendoza
of the University of North Texas for his spectacular maps.
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map 1. the southwestern military frontier
(Map courtesy Alexander Mendoza)

experiences of Fort Bascom’s soldiers. Spanish explorers, American merchants, and the U.S. Army Corps of Topographical Engineers left the first
written descriptions of this region and its people. Nuevomexicanos from the
Sangre de Cristo Mountains, Navajos from Bosque Redondo, Comanches
from the Llano Estacado, Americans from east of the Mississippi River, and
European transplants all crossed paths in the Canadian River Valley. Fort
Bascom’s location within this “cultural shatter zone,” situated in comanchería
and along ancient comanchero trade routes, offers compelling reasons to
reexamine its historical relevance to the Southwest.2
For most of the twentieth century, studies of western forts justified Manifest Destiny as a legitimate cause for westward expansion and substantiated
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Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, which verified the sequence of
events that led to the arrival of civilization and the closing of the frontier.
Other than J. Evetts Haley’s work, “The Comanchero Trade,” published in
1935, few historians focused on the Canadian River Valley’s history until the
latter part of the twentieth century. After Haley’s study, which noted Anglo
perceptions of a deeply rooted and troubled relationship that existed between
mountain and plains cultures, seventy years passed before another scholar
produced a significant study of this region. Franciscan priest and historian
Fr. Stanley Louis Crocchiola, writing under the pseudonym F. Stanley, and
scholar James A. Foster both wrote about Fort Bascom in the early 1960s, but
did not explore the entire region as Haley had done. Precious little on the
fort has been published since Stanley’s and Foster’s studies. Chris Emmett’s
and Leo E. Oliva’s examinations of Fort Union occasionally reference Fort
Bascom, as do Darlis A. Miller’s and Robert C. Carriker’s works on frontier
garrisons. Charles L. Kenner became the only historian in the twentieth
century to devote more than a few pages to Fort Bascom’s role in gaining
control of the southern Plains Indians. Forty years have passed since its first
publication.3
Inspired by David J. Weber, western historians in the last twenty years
have refocused on the Southwest. William deBuys, Dan Flores, and Andrés Reséndez followed Weber’s lead and revealed a world of cultural and
economic vitality. Additionally, Pekka Hämäläinen and Brian DeLay have
recently argued that the Native Americans and Hispanos who lived in this
region shaped southwestern history, not just as mere participants, but as active agents. Such examinations highlight that there is still much that can be
discovered by circling back to those places, such as Fort Bascom, that were
previously considered not worth the time for western historians.4
Although the Canadian River Valley’s latitude is about the same as central
Tennessee’s, the region is locked into an ecological zone similar to northern
Mexico’s.5 Moving west from the Texas Panhandle, this Lower Sonoran life
zone cuts through the Upper Sonoran grasslands of the upland plateaus
before turning northwest and beginning an ascent into the pine-forested
and snow-covered peaks of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. The Canadian
River drainage system covers 11,237 square miles, of which 34 percent are
mountains, 41 percent are plateaus, and 24 percent are lower-level canyons
and mesa lands that cut through the Southern Plains.6
Moving from west to east, the Canadian River begins 7,834 feet above sea
level in the Sangre de Cristo Mountains near Raton Pass. For approximately
one hundred miles, the river runs through the high llano before reaching
the edge of the Canadian Escarpment. From this juncture, the river quickly
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descends approximately two thousand feet to the valley floor, where it meanders for about forty miles to the Fort Bascom site. Farther east, near where the
Oklahoma and Texas panhandles meet, this once full-bodied river becomes
a sluggish stream that ambles along about 2,505 feet above sea level. The
journey from Raton Pass to the Texas border encompasses about 240 miles
of the river.7
Although many of the first Americans to cross into New Mexico left journals of their exploits, few, if any, were as talented in this endeavor as diarist
Josiah Gregg. During a year-long trip that took him into the Canadian River
Valley in 1839, he traveled along old Indian and contemporary comanchero
trade routes that ran along the Canadian River. These same trails later evolved
into the Fort Smith route that led back to Arkansas, where a portion of old
Route 66 and current Interstate 40 run from Amarillo to Albuquerque.8 On
the westward trek, Gregg followed the river as far as Tucumcari Peak near
where the Canadian River turns north. Eventually, the U.S. Army constructed
Fort Bascom at this river bend.
Gregg encountered “large parties of New Mexicans” traveling east and
recorded that they hunted game and searched out Comanches to trade
hard breads and produce for robes and other bison products.9 He also came
in contact with Native Americans along the route. In the early part of his
journey in 1839, where the Little River joined the Canadian, a small group of
Comanche and Kiowa warriors and their families joined Gregg’s caravan to
barter a few mules. About to embark into an unfamiliar region, Gregg asked
Chief Tábba-quena to describe the area. After giving the chief “paper and
pencil . . . he promptly executed . . . to our astonishment, quite a map-like
appearance, with far more accurate delineation of all the principle [sic] rivers
of the plains . . . than is to be found in many of the engraved maps of those
regions.”10
In 1839 Gregg learned something that mystified Americans for the next
forty years: Comanches and Kiowas did not need maps. Like other American
Indians, their homeland’s topography was imprinted in their minds. Regardless of distance, or the seemingly monotonous nature of the landscape, each
brook held special meaning. Cliffs and mesas were more than rocks and dirt,
more than the remnants of another geological world. Whether Jicarilla, Comanche, or Pueblo, the land appeared to be saying something different to the
Indians of the Southwest than it did to Gregg and many others who followed.
Historian William H. Goetzmann notes that nineteenth-century Americans
brought preconceptions of the western landscape with them, notions colored
with romanticism that seldom fit reality. Such disconnects often distorted both
their interpretation of the land and the people residing there.11
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Annexation of half of Mexico after the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848 prompted the United States to connect the existing nation
with the new territories. Congress approved several surveys by the Army
Corps of Topographical Engineers and charged them with determining and
mapping the best route for the transcontinental railroad. In 1853 Lt. Amiel
Weeks Whipple led a team of surveyors, scientists, and engineers along the
same Canadian River route Gregg had taken fourteen years earlier.12
With an engineer’s eye for detail, Whipple recorded more than just data
pertinent to constructing a railroad. Just north of present-day Amarillo, Texas,
Whipple met a group of Indians from Santo Domingo Pueblo. Draped in
Mexican blankets and wearing Indian headdresses and beads, they were on
their way to trade with the southern Plains tribes. These Puebloans rode mules
and packed hard breads and flour to trade with the “k’ai-ó-wás.” Whipple had
stumbled onto one of the permanent comanchero rendezvous sites.13
From the Texas Caprock to the Tucumcari outliers, Whipple wrote about
a variety of subjects unrelated to railroad topography. On both 18 and 21
September, his party met several Mexican traders heading east: “We had no
idea of the extent of this Indian trade, or the impunity with which defenseless
traders could mingle with these savages and treacherous tribes upon their
own soil.” Ten years later, the economic and social relationships that existed
between the Plains Indians and Nuevomexicanos still thrived, albeit under
the surveillance of the U.S. Army. Fort Bascom was placed at the epicenter
of the routes that connected these two cultures.14
During the early part of the nineteenth century, hundreds of thousands of
bison flowed through the prairies that followed the Canadian River, drawing
many cultures to the escarpments and high plains that surrounded it. By 1840
a reduction in the herd populations impacted the region’s trade dynamics. Successive Indian and comanchero harvests of furs and meats, as well as a major
drought, contributed to the bison’s decline. Current scholarship indicates that
by the time American surveyors entered the area to find the best transcontinental railroad route, the bison had already reached an ecological tipping point.
The final blow for the bison came with the arrival of commercial hunters
from the east.15 The results impacted every culture in the region. The theft of
livestock and humans always played a role in the region’s barter economy, but
the elimination of bison from within this exchange required a replacement.
Comanches adapted by extracting more livestock out of Texas and Mexico.
Cattle and horses, as well as humans, were funneled north to meet market
demands. The raiders’ trading partners, Nuevomexicanos and Pueblo Indians,
facilitated the movement of contraband eastward toward European Americans
and other Indians who lived along and beyond the Arkansas River.16
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In the 1850s, U.S. government officials ordered soldiers stationed at Fort
Union, twenty-six miles north of Las Vegas, New Mexico, to stop this illegal
trade. Until the early 1860s, this post, originally charged with providing
protection for merchants and other travelers venturing along the Santa Fe
Trail, remained the closest outpost to the Llano Estacado—the home of the
Comanches. Federal authorities were forced to reevaluate their military position in New Mexico after the outbreak of the Civil War. They closed many
posts out of financial duress. At the same time, strategic necessity caused Pres.
Abraham Lincoln’s administration to approve a few new posts, including Fort
Bascom.17
In March 1862, Confederate Brig. Gen. Henry H. Sibley’s Army of the
West invaded territorial New Mexico. Sibley’s men, mostly Texans, made
great progress until they ventured into the Sangre de Cristo Mountains, where
they were repulsed at Glorieta Pass. Despite the Confederate defeat, New
Mexicans remained wary, fearing they had not seen the last of the Texans.
At the time of the invasion, territorial delegate John S. Watts wrote to Union
major general Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Department of the
Missouri, stating that if Halleck would only “look at the map,” he would see
that once the Confederates sacked Santa Fe, they would have a clear path
down the Canadian River to “threaten Missouri.” Like many Union officers
stationed in the region, Watts believed the Canadian River warranted military
attention. Brig. Gen. James H. Carleton, commander of Union forces in New
Mexico Territory, issued a series of warnings to his field officers that echoed
Watt’s concern. It was also rumored that John R. Baylor, by then the ousted
governor of Confederate Arizona, had raised six thousand Texas volunteers
in preparation for launching another invasion. Union officers possessed information that led them to believe Baylor would lead a force up through the
Texas Panhandle and down the Canadian toward Fort Union. Documents
clearly illustrate that the early impetus for creating Fort Bascom originated
from the Union’s fear of this second invasion.18
On 26 October 1862, Carleton ordered Capt. William H. Backus to lead
the Second Colorado Volunteer Infantry, Company C, out of Fort Union
to a point on the Canadian River northeast of Tucumcari Peak, to establish
a base camp that could sound the alarm if Baylor attacked. Carleton was
specific in his instructions: He ordered Backus to shoot any rebel scouts his
men spotted. He also instructed them to stampede the livestock and burn
the prairie grass in front of any opposing force. Calling this position Camp
Easton, Company C kept their eyes on the Fort Smith road, a major trail
that connected the Texas Panhandle to the high plains of New Mexico.
This camp remained an extension of Fort Union until the following August.
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Soldiers used available logs, rocks, and branches, as well as dug cavities into
the hillsides to create temporary living quarters. Besides watching for Confederates, these soldiers also protected the region’s travelers, the U.S. mail,
and supply trains. Although Indian attacks had increased after 1861, Captain
Backus was ordered to use nearby Comanches as scouts along this trail, in
an effort to build an alliance with them. During this same period, Carleton
ordered Backus’s troops to shoot any Mescalero Apache or Navajo man that
they came into contact with in an attempt to force others to remain on the
nearby Bosque Redondo Reservation. In addition he ordered the arrest of
any Anglos or Mexicans who were not carrying proper passes.19
Camp Easton proved its value early in its existence. Only six days after the
camp was established, on 1 November, a group of Comanches approached
Backus’s patrol with information about a large wagon train traveling on the
Fort Smith road into Texas. The next day, along with the Comanches, Backus
and his troops sought out and apprehended eighteen Confederate sympathizers and their families near the confluence of the Canadian River and
“Utah” Creek. After the Union patrol surrounded and captured this caravan,
which had just left Las Vegas, New Mexico, and was on its way to Texas, the
Comanches demanded at least one of the travelers and half the party’s possessions as reward for their assistance. Backus explained to a growing group
of agitated southern Plains Indians, including a Chief “Mowa,” that he was
willing to pay them for their services, but the “prisoners” would remain under
his protection. Company C escorted the entire party to Fort Union.20 Over
the next several months, similar patrols set out from Camp Easton in search
of rebel invaders. The soldiers’ reports were peppered with incidents related
to encountering “Mexicans” making their way onto the Llano Estacado
with carts and wagons loaded with goods to trade with Comanches. Sorting
out who these people were and what to do about them took up much of the
army’s time after the war ended. Such travelers and traders with whom the
army dealt were not new to the area.21
Both volunteer and regular army units were cognizant of the dangers
found in the Canadian River Valley. Just a few weeks before Camp Easton
was dissolved, Sgt. Jose Lucero and privates Juan F. Ortiz and Jose Barreras of
Company I, First New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry, were attacked by a band of
Navajos while herding cattle near Conchas Springs. The ensuing gun battle
lasted until sundown. The Indians left the area with all the livestock, certain
that the three soldiers were dead. Private Barreras survived the attack despite
being hit on the head with a rock by an Indian. Once he regained consciousness, he dumped his deceased compatriots’ guns in Conchas Creek and
walked back to the camp with eight arrows protruding from his body. Capt.
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Edward H. Bergmann and several horsemen from the regiment’s Company
I were soon on the Navajos’ trail, killing two and wounding several others.
They were only able to recover three beeves.22
On 15 August 1863, three weeks after the attack on Lucero, Ortiz, and Barreras, Capt. Peter W. L. Plympton led the Seventh U.S. Infantry, Company
F, and Bergmann’s Company I out of Fort Union to replace Camp Easton
with Fort Bascom, a permanent outpost on the Canadian River. Prior to this
move, Captain Plympton had served as commander of Fort Union. Watts,
who a year earlier had urged Major General Halleck to remember the strategic importance of the region, leased two square miles of his property to the
government for the new fort. Plympton located Fort Bascom on the south side
of the river, about fifty miles from the Texas border. While the first Union
patrols stationed at Camp Easton used Comanches to scout the Fort Smith
road, officers began to back away from this strategy as early as December
1863. In General Orders No. 20, Acting Asst. Adj. Gen. Ben C. Cutler noted
that Fort Bascom would “be an outpost to New Mexico during the present
rebellion, its advanced pickets watching the roads from Arkansas and Texas,
it will be of great importance in preventing the predatory incursion of the
Comanche and Kiowa Indians.”23
The approval of another fort, Fort Butler, three years earlier indicates
that army officials were aware of this region’s strategic significance. Formally
approved on 12 March 1860, the original plans for Fort Butler called for its
construction along the Gallinas River near the Fort Smith road crossing. In the
latter part of the 1850s, depredations along the Santa Fe Trail had decreased.
This was largely due to Fort Union’s success in protecting this road. By 1860
such success had nearly rendered the building of Fort Butler unnecessary.
By the turn of the decade, and before the Confederacy was a certainty, the
army’s greatest regional concern had become the southern Plains Indians
who controlled much of eastern New Mexico. Many officers in the Department of New Mexico lobbied to have their main supply depot pushed further
south to better address this problem. Fort Butler was to serve this purpose.
Cost and logistical considerations, however, prevented its construction.24
Three years later, the U.S. Army built Fort Bascom. They named the
fort for twenty-six-year-old Capt. George N. Bascom of the Sixteenth U.S.
Infantry, who was killed at the Battle of Valverde on 21 February 1862. Bascom
was already a well-known officer in the region before he died fighting the
Confederacy. In October 1860, while a lieutenant stationed at Fort Buchanan,
Bascom was ordered to search for a boy believed to have been stolen by a band
of Chiricahua Apaches led by Cochise. The meeting quickly degenerated into
violence. As a result, Bascom and his men killed some of Cochise’s relatives,
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ill. 1. government sketch of
fort bascom
The letters on the diagram
represent the following: A and AI,
cavalry st ables; B, cavalry corral; C,
quartermaster’s corral; D and DI,
officers’ quarters; E, quartermaster’s
storehouse; F, commissary’s
storehouse; III, storehouse; K,
barracks; L, mess hall; M and
MI, laundresses’ quarters; N, old
hospit al; NI, new hospit al; P, guard
house.
(Illustration from “Description of Military Posts,” p. 1, vol. 49, James W. Arrott
Collection, University Archives, Thomas C. Donnelly Library, New Mexico
Highlands University, Las Vegas, New Mexico)

sparking a series of Chiricahuan raids and reprisals across the Southwest. A
few months later, these same Chiricahuas trapped a contingent of the Seventh U.S. Infantry under Bascom’s command at Apache Pass in present-day
Arizona. Army surgeon Bernard J. D. Irwin led a group of volunteers to these
soldiers’ rescue, which resulted in Irwin receiving the Congressional Medal
of Honor, the earliest action to achieve this honor. Bascom died in the heat
of battle in 1862. In August 1863, the newly constructed fort was named in
honor of the Seventh Infantry’s fallen leader.25
Unlike the soldiers at Camp Easton, who were left to create their own
temporary dwellings, the Department of New Mexico’s quartermaster hired
twenty civilians to construct Fort Bascom. The post was built “on a plateau
about 20 feet above the river bottom, and 500 yards from the bed of the river,
which, [at that time was] . . . about 25 feet wide and 2 or 3 feet in depth. . . . On
the opposite side of the stream is a bluff from 50 to 60 feet in height, beyond
which the country is rolling and broken.” The water was noted to be best
from November to March, before the spring snow melted. As levels rose,
the river became “muddy and loaded with organic matter.” It became the
eastern-most garrison facing both Confederate Texas and the homeland of
numerous bands of Comanche and Kiowa Indians. Fort Union sat about 115
miles to the northwest, a good three-day ride. Fort Sumner lay ninety miles
to the south (see map 1).26
Constructed in November 1862, Fort Sumner rested along the Pecos River
in the midst of another significant comanchero trade route. After subduing
the Mescalero Apaches, Carleton directed that they be moved to the area
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known as Bosque Redondo, just outside the fort, to start life anew as agriculturalists. Carleton was convinced that the southern Plains Indians needed to
adapt to European American farming techniques in order to survive. In early
1864, Col. Christopher “Kit” Carson initiated operations that drove Navajos
out of their Cañon de Chelly homeland and toward Bosque Redondo. The
forced migration of the Navajos to this reservation eventually created many
problems for the soldiers stationed along the Canadian River.27
Fort Bascom consisted of five officers’ quarters, commissary storehouses, a
mess hall, a blockhouse, barracks large enough to house two full companies,
a kitchen, laundry area, and stables. Even before hiring civilian laborers,
Carleton ordered adobe molds built and delivered to Camp Easton for use at
the new location. From the beginning, there appears to have been a problem
with the adobe bricks used on the fort. The absence of organic materials
in the soil led to leaching, erosion, and a sort of melting of the soil when it
became wet, which contributed to the adobe’s deterioration over time. Before construction, Carleton approved Captain Plympton’s written request to
have at least some of the structures built of cottonwood logs. The roofs for
the buildings were made of rows of logs covered with dirt. The outpost was
protected by a perimeter wall of the same materials. Both the walls and an
accompanying trench one thousand feet long and fifty feet wide surrounded
the garrison. Gregg did not exaggerate when he observed that the soils around
the Canadian seemed to “melt” when touched by water. For the duration
of its existence, the fort’s walls and roof proved to be a major inconvenience
to the posts’ residences. Such problems influenced its eventual closure as a
full-time base in 1870.28
The diversity of traffic flow along the Fort Smith road posed several problems for patrols that originated out of Fort Bascom. A great percentage of
regular army officers and privates from the East Coast or Europe found it almost impossible to distinguish between comancheros and Native Americans,
or between legal and illegal Hispano entrepreneurs. Upon arriving to take
command of the post, Maj. Andrew J. Alexander wrote: “I find no orders or
instructions here in regard to Indian traders. Pueblo Indians are constantly
passing here with permits signed by some Indian Agent. Will you please give
me any instructions the General Commanding may have in reference to the
matter?” Additionally, the environment generally demanded a style of dress
that led many travelers to wear similar garb, regardless of their background,
adding to a soldier’s general confusion. Attire alone was not the only source
of confusion for the soldiers. On one scout out of Fort Bascom, Bergmann,
now a lieutenant colonel, estimated that “one half of the Comanche warriors,
which I have seen, were either Mexican Captives or such Mexicans who go
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among the Indians voluntarily, preferring this style of life.” Coupled with the
difficulty in distinguishing friend from foe, western expansion beyond the
Mississippi River exacerbated the volatile relationship between the soldiers
and the people who already lived in the new territories. Animosity between
the U.S. Army and southern Plains Indians grew throughout the 1860s.29
Like most frontier posts, soldiers found little to like about Fort Bascom.
The original design for the post was never completed. This design included
barracks that could hold four companies yet it never adequately housed more
than two. Despite their structural drawbacks, the barracks, consisting of four
one-hundred-by-twenty-foot, hard-packed-dirt-floor rooms, were designed to
account for the valley’s harsh winters. Each room housed three fireplaces.
The five officers’ quarters were built on the other side of the plaza. Although
officers’ rooms were small, fifteen by nine feet, leaky roofs were the largest
issue with these buildings. Only a few years after being built, Major Alexander
complained that only two of the five rooms were habitable because of the
leaks. Another problem concerned access to the river. The Canadian ran
below ground level, which prevented the soldiers from digging an acequia
that could water their gardens. This task, as well as others, required daily
water-wagon details that included filling several large casks and hauling
them back to the fort. Capt. John Dubois, like most frontier soldiers, tried
to make the best of a bad situation, commenting in a letter to his mother on
how he was able to make a “great show” of his quarters while stationed at
Fort Bascom with just a few books, pictures, and “scant” furniture.30
In the fall of 1864, eight thousand Navajos and a few hundred Mescaleros
were living at Bosque Redondo, ninety miles south of Fort Bascom. By then
General Carleton’s grand plan of converting these Indians into southwestern
agriculturalists was already unraveling. The Navajos had cultivated 2,367
acres, but the crops the soil produced were not enough to sustain the amount
of people living on the reservation. As the commissary general of subsistence
explained to the secretary of war, however, something in the soil was also
proving to be insidiously problematic. Brig. Gen. Amos B. Eaton wrote, “Some
portions of the farms [the land] exhibit on the surface a white efflorescence
of an alkaline character, which in contribution with river water, contains a
principle highly destructive to cereal forms of vegetative life.” An absence
of organic materials within the soils led to further leaching of nutrients and
erosion. Hail storms, insects, and a resistance among some Navajos to farming also impacted production.31
The inability of the Navajos to farm at Bosque Redondo impacted military
operations within the region. On 18 November 1866, Capt. William Hawley of
the Third U.S. Cavalry stationed at Fort Bascom reported: “Straggling bands of
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Indians (Navajoes) from the Reservation . . . [were] roaming over the country,
killing and stealing citizen stock in the vicinity of the post. Scouts, which have
been sent from this post have been fired upon by them, but were unable to
capture them owing to the impassable character of the ‘Mesa Rica,’ which
seems to be the General Rendezvous.” In the same report, Captain Hawley
asked his superiors for clarification regarding the escapees: “I am informed
of the issue of the Order to shoot them. . . . I would respectfully request,
that I may be furnished with Instructions in this case.” On 30 May 1866, 2nd
Lt. Thomas Smith, post adjutant in Santa Fe, passed along orders to Capt.
Patrick H. Healy of the First New Mexico Volunteer Infantry, commanding
a picket post near the fort, to “kill all Navajo men that you should be able to
catch (Pass or no pass).” On the one hand, Carleton begged Comm. of Ind.
Aff. William P. Dole to furnish adequate food and clothing for the Navajos
and Mescaleros placed at Bosque Redondo. On the other, however, Carleton
demanded the ultimate punishment for any male Indian caught elsewhere.32
The situation grew worse. By 1868 incarcerated residents of the Fort
Sumner Indian Reservation died almost daily from starvation, disease, and
the elements. Bands of escapees roamed the region between the Pecos and
Canadian rivers, looking for food and routes that led away from the Bosque
Redondo. Comm. of Ind. Aff. Nathaniel G. Taylor warned government
officials, “If allowed to go where they choose, we may expect to hear of
murders, robberies, and depredations committed by them without number.
They would in time, struggle back to their old homes and renew stealing
expeditions.” The regulars and volunteers posted at Fort Bascom spent the
majority of their time dealing with these Navajos.33
Mesa Rica was the geologic bridge that connected the Canadian and
Pecos river valleys. This four-mile-long formation, located west of Fort Bascom, was given constant attention by pickets and patrols, yet soldiers seldom
caught anyone. Part of the problem was Anglos from back East had a hard
time remaining oriented in a land of few trees and horizons broken only
by the mesas and mirages of the eroded plains. Captain Dubois, however,
understood the need for help and requested seventy-five dollars to secure a
“Mexican” scout, noting, “I can do nothing without a good guide.” Dubois
explained to his superiors that 2nd Lt. Lambert L. Mulford of the Third U.S.
Cavalry, Company D, could attest that a poor guide was just as dangerous as
any wayward Indian. Dubois wrote: “The man who acted as a guide for him
[Mulford’s patrol] knows nothing of the country and got lost. He [Mulford]
was 52 hours without water and his men and animals suffered seriously.”34
Although these patrols seldom engaged in major battles with the Native
Americans, the valley remained a dangerous place. In one instance, one
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map 2. fort bascom and the llano estacado
Positioned in the eroded plains of New Mexico, Fort Bascom was also
perched on the doorstep of the Llano Est acado.
(Map courtesy Alexander Mendoza)

American and four Nuevomexicanos were attacked by comancheros while
extracting salt from a nearby dry lake bed. Each was shot through the head
and “the fingers and thumb of the right hands were cut off.” On a patrol that
apprehended a large party of Nuevomexicanos moving southeast along the
Pecos River, one of these men related to Captain Backus that more comancheros were expected. Once these traders arrived, they planned to continue
the journey toward the Llano Estacado, even “if they had to cut the soldiers’
throats.”35
Fort Bascom constantly received reports from local Nuevomexicanos
of Indians raiding nearby ranches for livestock. After such reports, a patrol
would mount up and give chase. On 4 May 1866, 2nd Lt. Cornelius Daley,
First New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry, led a typical response to Mesa Rica, a
common escape route due to its “impassable nature.” Ten infantrymen and
seven cavalrymen followed Daley west to seek out and “destroy all Navajoe and
Apache Indians (men) coming to that neighborhood without passports.” Taking only one blanket and their greatcoats, they were supplied with forty days’
rations and one hundred rounds of ammunition.36 The soldiers approached
Mesa Rica from the southeast and rode to the top, 5,407 feet above sea level.
For three days they patrolled the mesa, searching the arroyos and ridges for
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Indians who had escaped the Bosque Redondo. On the third day, the patrol
descended from the mesa’s sandstone and caliche-capped peak, following
the river north up the valley until they reached the mouth of Canyon Largo,
about fifty miles away. Here the valley ended, the face of the Canadian escarpment rising up to meet the Las Vegas plateau. Lieutenant Colonel Bergmann
joined 1st Lieutenant Daley on this search and reported, “I beg leave here
to state that the rumors of pretended ‘Navajoe outrages’ committed in the
Conchas Valley near the mountain ‘Corazon,’ ‘Mesa Rica’ . . . and ‘Canon
Largo,’ etc. etc. are almost daily brought in here by Mexicans.” Bergmann
explained that he believed the locals sent soldiers on wild goose chases so
illegal contraband could flow through the valley without being detected, allowing trade along the ancient routes that connected the mountains to the
plains to continue.37
The environment surrounding Mesa Rica was hard on the soldiers and
their animals. Evaporation rates strong enough to eliminate fifty inches of
ground moisture prevailed in a region that only averaged twenty inches of
rainfall annually.38 For most Anglos, the land around Fort Bascom was never
much more than a dry, rocky, windy hell-hole of sand and lizards where
they never quite got their bearings. Gregg’s “sublimity of desolation” was
more desolate than sublime for the troops forced to exist with one blanket, a
greatcoat, and their wits. On 10 May 1867, a letter by Dubois summarized the
way most soldiers felt about the region: “This post is very insecure. The water
is carried from the river to the post in water wagons, a distance of half a mile. If
any of the prarie [sic] tribes should be hostile this summer this post is exposed to
. . . danger.”39 Such places could be just as unforgiving to the Jicarilla Apaches
or Nuevomexicanos that traversed the region, but they did not consider the
eroded plains or the Llano Estacado an alien landscape. Place was woven
into the greater fabric of their lives, as were the animals, the weather, and the
rocks.40 The Canadian River Valley provided Nuevomexicanos, Puebloans,
Comanches, and Jicarilla Indians with a vibrant, multi-faceted ecosystem
on which to survive. The mountains, ravines, and grasslands helped shape
their culture. For some, it was a holy land, for others, just home. Only after
Anglo soldiers began to attain a similar view did military momentum in the
valley shift. And with each desolate day, the soldiers and officers acquired
more information on their surroundings and their adversaries.41
In the process of adapting to the Canadian River Valley bioregion, the
soldiers and their animals suffered from lack of supplies. As mentioned above,
prior to the Civil War, the army canceled a plan to move its main supply
center away from Fort Union to Fort Butler along the Canadian River due
to cost and logistical considerations. Many patrols that originated out of
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Fort Bascom failed to achieve their goals because the soldiers ran out of
supplies and forage before apprehending the escaping Navajos or elusive
comancheros. If Fort Butler had replaced Fort Union as the main supply
depot in New Mexico, perhaps many of the patrols could have been more
successful in tracking down the Navajos and comancheros. For most of
the 1860s, insufficient supplies, a lack of guides, and general ignorance
of the land contributed to Fort Bascom’s soldiers’ inability to control either the southern Plains Indians or their trading partners. Despite these
difficulties, Capt. Louis Morris reported in 1866, “The troops at this post
have been doing the usual fatigue, garrison, and scouting duties.” These
scouts contributed to an ever-growing accumulation of information on the
region and its people. Such intelligence was disseminated throughout the
Department of New Mexico and later the Department of Missouri, which
included Texas in the 1870s.42
An event in 1864 illustrates how past experiences impacted future strategies.
Carson learned a valuable lesson at the Battle of Adobe Walls.43 In May 1864,
Comanche and Kiowa raiding along the Santa Fe Trail was already escalating when several white American teamsters were attacked and gruesomely
murdered at the Lower Cimarron Springs. Three Hispanos who were part of
this supply train were allowed to go free, which galled Commander Carleton.
He was already convinced that many of the Nuevomexicanos who traded
with the Indians also scouted and occasionally raided with them, underscoring why they often escaped harm during such attacks. The teamsters’ deaths
spurred Carleton to launch an expedition against Comanche and Kiowa
villages located about two hundred miles to the east in the Texas Panhandle.
Colonel Carson, fresh from ushering the Navajos to Fort Sumner, led 14 officers, 321 enlisted men, 75 Ute and Jicarilla auxiliaries, and 100 pack mules
on a two-hundred-mile march out of Fort Bascom and down the Canadian
River to kill the Comanche and Kiowa warriors, and to destroy their villages.
The famous Indian fighter and his soldiers failed in this endeavor, lucky to
get out of Texas with their lives.44
The battle took place just east of the crumbling ruins of an old outpost
known as Adobe Walls. Soon after Carson’s forces reached their target, thousands of Kiowas and Comanches surrounded them and unleashed their full
force on Carson’s men. If not for two wagon-mounted howitzers, it is doubtful the Union soldiers and their auxiliaries would have been able to escape.
Carleton blamed the comancheros, suspecting that they had warned the
Indians of the coming attack. In their reports, Carson and his men marveled
at their adversaries’ adroit combat skills and strategic wherewithal. Forced to
acknowledge the deadly ramifications of blindly assuming the triumphant
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ill. 2. new mexican masonic lodge leaders in the 1860s
In this photo, by Nicholas Brown, Lt. Col. Edward H. Bergmann of Fort
Bascom is standing on the far left. Col. Christopher “Kit” Carson is seated
in the center. Brig. Gen. James H. Carleton is seated on the far right.
(Photograph courtesy Palace of the Governors Photo Archives [NMHM/
DCA], neg. no. 009826)

inevitability of the U.S. Army’s mission to control the southern Plains Indians, the sixty-nine Fort Bascom soldiers attached to this expedition, if not
everyone within the Military Department of New Mexico, learned from the
excursion’s failure.45
Although the results of Carson’s mission were spun in a manner that
protected reputations and honor, this battle indicated just how difficult
gaining control of this borderland region would be for the U.S. Army. Officers and soldiers alike, especially those posted along the Canadian River,
which remained the forward edge of the battlefront for the next ten years,
painfully realized that conquest over the southern Plains Indians would take
more than technological superiority or presupposed ideological notions of
national grandeur. Army officers understood they had to reshape their strategy into one that incorporated information regarding the environment and
new tactics before significant progress could take place in the Southwest.
In the meantime, the Comanches and Kiowas of the Canadian River Valley
demonstrated that they were equal to any force the U.S. Army could put in
the field, exhibiting no fear of their Anglo adversaries.
On 25 July 1866, Lieutenant Colonel Bergmann experienced the southern
Plains Indians’ confidence in their ability to defend themselves firsthand.
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Sent to find the “principal Chiefs” of the warring tribes and conduct a
council, after traveling 250 miles to the southeast, Bergmann and his small
party were eventually allowed to ride into the heart of the main village. He
counted 160 lodges on the journey into their camp. During his meeting
with “Sher-qui-na-Kwagh,” “Pi-ti-tes-whe,” and many other chiefs, he noted
in his report: “All of these Indians are splendidly mounted and well provided
(by the traders) with arms. I have seen not one Indian without revolver, great
many were even armed with two of them . . . It is astonishing what a great
number of mexicans there are living with these Indians.” He estimated that at
least half the warriors they encountered were of Nuevomexicano or Mexican
descent. Like Carleton, Bergmann believed they were being used as spies
and decoys along the Fort Smith road and elsewhere.46
Everyone within the Comanche village treated the Americans with undisguised scorn. As to the nature of his visit, and whether some future truce
between their peoples might be possible, Bergmann informed Maj. Cyrus
de Forrest, the acting assistant adjutant general, that the Comanches and
Kiowas did not appear to care one way or the other. He wrote, “I heard them
say it will not pay to go any longer to Texas for those people have already been
robbed poor and it is there-fore apparent that these Indians are now hunting
for an excuse . . . to rob and murder in New Mexico.” Such a report makes
clear what a complicated, dangerous, and difficult mission the men of Fort
Bascom and other frontier outposts faced in the first years after the Civil War.
Writing history requires that scholars detail what the men on the ground
knew of events as they transpired, but it is just as important to communicate
what the subject did not know. It is doubtful Bergmann spent much time in
1866 contemplating the inevitable decline and destruction of the southern
Plains Indians.47
The following year, Capt. George W. Letterman, who now commanded
Fort Bascom, reported the results of 1st Sgt. Charles Brown’s scout of 23
August 1867. This patrol consisted of men from the 125th U.S. Colored
Infantry, Company K. Sergeant Brown and his soldiers captured six comancheros near the New Mexico–Texas border. They were herding eleven
pack mules loaded with trade merchandise. These Hispanos did not have
licenses to trade with the Indians, but claimed their papers were just to the
east, having left them with traders that were “up ahead.” The pack mules
were carrying “200 pounds of corn meal, 500 of Mexican hard bread, 35 or
40 butcher knives . . . tea, sugar, flour . . . one box of Army caps (100) about
(400) percussion caps (small)-several pounds of lead, about 5 pounds of
Powder and 16 Enongated [sic] Balls Cav. Cal. 58.”48 Captain Letterman’s
report illustrates how vibrant this market remained. Letterman also noted
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that his men constantly stopped “several parties with trains on their way to
the Comanche Country to trade.” Within this same report he revealed that in
one ten-day span of scouts, his soldiers had appropriated over eight hundred
stolen cattle from Comanches and comancheros.49
In December 1868, Col. Andrew W. Evans and six troops of the Third
U.S. Cavalry, a company of the Thirty-Seventh U.S. Infantry, a battery of
mountain howitzers, and a large contingent of Ute auxiliaries moved east
out of Fort Bascom. They headed down the Canadian River toward Antelope
Hills, the same destination of Carson’s failed expedition of 1864, on a similar
mission. This time, however, Colonel Evans’s troops were accompanied by
Capt. Eugene A. Carr’s men from Fort Lyon to stop the theft of cattle and
horses in Texas. Evans kept a copy of Carson’s report with him on this march,
proving the value of the earlier expedition despite Carson’s failure. Evans’s
men made contact with and skirmished against the Kwahada Comanches
in Texas, chasing them in a running gun battle across the panhandle to a
point twenty miles above Fort Cobb, in Oklahoma. In the process, Evans’s
soldiers destroyed Nokoni Chief Horseback’s village. After the skirmish, many
of the southern Plains Indians surrendered at Fort Bascom. A greater majority
slipped away to fight another day. The U.S. Army achieved final victory only
after military officials organized several columns to converge on the Natives
from multiple directions.50
Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie’s victory at Palo Duro Canyon on 28 September 1874 was the fruition of Lt. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s new strategy to
penetrate comanchería from different directions and to eliminate avenues
of escape. Only three Comanches were killed in the attack. Casualty wise,
this was typical of most battles fought in the region. The destruction of over
one thousand Indian horses, however, was atypical. The elimination of the
Comanches’ horse population diminished their remaining wealth and their
ability to evade their enemy or hunt for food. While Mackenzie approached
the Llano Estacado from Fort Concho, Maj. William R. Price led about
two hundred and twenty-five troopers from Fort Bascom toward the same
location. Like Major Evans, Price left this post with Carson’s report of his
“scout” down the Canadian River to Adobe Walls in 1864. While Price’s
men failed to engage the southern Plains Indians in a crucial battle, they did
skirmish against Comanches and Kiowas near the Dry Fork of the Wichita
River. Their presence, along with the other columns, reduced the space in
which the Indians could operate. In the end, occupying space, removing
resources, and converging on the Indians from different directions proved
to be the winning strategy. The accolades Mackenzie and the Fourth U.S.
Cavalry acquired for their actions were legitimate. This acclaim, however,
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often failed to recognize the contributions of soldiers who helped set the
stage for this climatic battle.51
***
The tropes of the U.S. Army’s superiority and American ingenuity do not
explain how the Comanches and Kiowas were finally forced onto their reservations. If superior firepower and intellect were not the main arbiters of western
expansion, what was, and what role does Fort Bascom play in the answer? Current scholarship keenly illustrates how adept and adaptive Native Americans
were to their changing geopolitical environment. Historians such as Gary
Clayton Anderson, Todd F. Smith, Juliana Barr, Hämäläinen, and DeLay have
all demonstrated that Native Americans were certainly equal to the French,
Spanish, and U.S. settlers and soldiers who desired their land. Although Fort
Bascom failed to continue as a full-time military base after 1870, it continued
to house cavalrymen as a temporary base, used for patrols, picket details, and
a staging area for military expeditions into the Texas Panhandle.52
The evolution of the American soldier from an easterner out of his element into an adaptable frontier fighter began with long-distance excursions
such as those experienced by the infantry and cavalry posted at Fort Bascom.
Experience gained from prior expeditions and mundane “fatigue, garrison
duty, and scouts” was incorporated into future strategies more suited to the
existing environment. The U.S. Army only gained the knowledge required to
defeat the Comanches after soldiers were inserted into comanchería. No post
was closer to this homeland than Fort Bascom. When searching for either the
comancheros or the Indians, it was common for cavalry stationed there to ride
for hundreds of miles in all directions, journeys that encompassed much of
northern and central New Mexico and a great deal of the Texas Panhandle.
Second Lt. Harrison S. Weeks led twenty-four enlisted men of the Eighth U.S.
Cavalry “on a scout towards the Llano Estacado” of 409 miles. Col. Ranald
Mackenzie’s Fourth U.S. Cavalry was posted to Fort Richardson, considered
Texas’s northernmost frontier fort in the 1870s. Fort Richardson was three
hundred miles from Palo Duro Canyon, whereas Fort Bascom was located
only one hundred and fifty miles to the west. Prior to 1874, soldiers stationed
along the Canadian River in New Mexico scouted this region many times and
participated in two major expeditions onto the Llano Estacado. In early 1863,
army officers already knew that many of their problems with Indians were
related to the comancheros. Nuevomexicano and Puebloan traders supplied
Indians with gunpowder, rifles, and food products in exchange for Mexican
and Texan cattle. Fort Bascom soldiers spent a great deal of time on their
horses chasing the comancheros and their trading partners, in the process
learning where the best rendezvous sites and water holes were located.53
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An examination of the patrols illustrates how these men were required
to overcome a talented adversary on their own turf. Such missions required
finding a way to shorten both time and distance in a land that seemed to
stretch forever. The solution was riding out of the fort at midnight and not
stopping until noon the next day. These patrols highlight an emerging strategy
that acknowledged overwhelming force was not the critical factor in gaining
control of the southern Plains; acclimating to the environment was just as
crucial. Cavalry crisscrossing known Indian and comanchero trails at night
details how familiar soldiers were becoming with the landscape, implementing tactics that they ultimately used to gain control of the southern Plains
Indians who refused to go to reservations. On 2 November 1862, Captain
Backus led a patrol out of Camp Easton in search of a band of comancheros reported to be traveling down the Fort Smith road to Texas. Leaving at
midnight with twenty men, Backus and his troops traveled twenty-five miles
by sunrise, and continued another twenty before realizing the traders had
turned around. Backus returned to Camp Easton. On 6 November he and his
men again left camp at midnight but this time caught up with one hundred
Nuevomexicanos, thirty empty wagons, and one hundred and fifty head of
“fat cattle,” on the way to the Llano Estacado. In his report, Backus noted that
he was familiar with two hundred and fifty miles of the surrounding area.54
From the beginning, soldiers from Fort Bascom swept for hundreds
of miles in all directions, assimilating topographical, environmental, and
demographic information into their memories, which made them better
soldiers. For instance, in August 1863, Lt. William Brady and twenty-five
privates of the First New Mexico Volunteer Cavalry, Company I, spent
thirty days on the move, ordered to “hunt up and destroy Parties of Navajoes
[sic] or Apaches.” They traveled sixty miles up the Canadian River, paying
particular attention to the mouth of the Conchas and the deep, red-walled
canyon from which it emerged. Carrying anywhere from fifteen to thirty days’
rations and hundreds of rounds of ammunition on pack mules, these scouts
followed ancient footpaths and cart trails that wound around, through, and
over Canyon Largo, “Corazon” Mountain, atop the Caprock, and across the
llano. They followed signs of men and women on foot, horses, wagon-tracks,
and freshly made cattle trails. Water was never plentiful and when found, its
salinity made it undrinkable. Forage was sparse to nonexistent.
On another extended journey, about 250 miles to the southeast of Fort
Bascom, Lieutenant Colonel Bergmann found a large Comanche village
“very close to the Texas settlements.” On 8 September 1867, Captain Letterman, leading Company K of the 125th U.S. Colored Infantry, chased a
group of mule thieves “90 to 100” miles before capturing them.55 Certainly
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few Americans ever became as familiar with the region as the Indians they
eventually conquered. They did, however, make substantial progress after
coming to accept the land as it was, discounting any preconceived notions
of what it was supposed to be or what it might become. Such adaptation
allowed the U.S. Army to develop an effective southwestern Indian policy,
which relied more on economic warfare and maintaining key positions along
the old trade routes than bloody battlefield victories.
Aside from Carson’s, Evans’s, and Price’s military penetrations into
Texas, patrols originating from Fort Bascom routinely cut across the Llano
Estacado in search of illegal traders and Comanches. On 26 August 1870, 1st
Lt. Robert Carrick led nine Eighth U.S. Cavalry troopers down a “recently
discovered trail” that led into Texas to break up “illicit traffic.” In 1872 an
unnamed soldier identified only as “bugler” of the same outfit published a
report in the Freeport (Ill.) Journal describing his experiences as a trooper
under Capt. James F. Randlett, Eighth U.S. Cavalry, Company D. Captain
Randlett established his base at Fort Bascom after it no longer served as a
full-time post. Christening himself a “horse marine,” the unknown “bugler”
noted his company had been patrolling the region since 1869. In mid-1871,
the Daily New Mexican corroborated Company D’s impact: “The vigorous
campaign opened by the military authorities [out of Fort Bascom] upon the
Comanche traders, is already showing its affect [sic].” Captain Randlett and
other soldiers of the Eighth Cavalry would later use techniques learned in
New Mexico assisting the Texas Rangers in their efforts to halt cattle theft
along the southern Rio Grande.56
Colonel Mackenzie made his first patrol of the Llano Estacado in 1871,
three years prior to the Fourth’s victory at Palo Duro Canyon. On a much
larger scale, this earlier mission resembled Lieutenant Carrick’s scout in 1870.
Carrick was ordered to bring a halt to the comanchero trade and eliminate
warring Indians wherever he found them. Mackenzie’s expedition took him
all the way to Fort Bascom before he turned south to scout out Quitaque and
Tule Canyon. While few comancheros or Indians were apprehended on that
patrol, Maj. Gen. Christopher C. Augur, commander of the Department of
Texas, believed such efforts boded well for the army, noting any information
gained regarding the region’s topography or resources could be incorporated
into future strategies. In the decade prior to Mackenzie’s foray into northwest
Texas, similar expeditions and numerous scouts to the same area originated
out of Fort Bascom. Captains Backus and Letterman, Lieutenant Colonel
Bergmann, and the many regular and volunteer infantry and cavalry officers
routinely posted their observations and experiences to the army’s headquarters,
which also boded well for the army’s future in the Southwest.57
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Isolated from its historical context, Fort Bascom does not appear to warrant much attention. The Canadian River, however, runs through the heart
of southwestern history, and Fort Bascom was strategically placed along
this stream. Situated in the eroded plains of New Mexico, facing the Llano
Estacado, amid comanchería and astride ancient comanchero trails, soldiers
who served there did important duty. Gaining control of the frontier was
hard, dirty work accomplished more by the soldiers’ and officers’ experiences
than by any grand and glamorous bugle-led charge. Fort Bascom’s soldiers,
whether lost in the shadow of Mesa Rica or hauling water from the Canadian River, were involved in the process of learning how to exist in this hard
country. Goetzmann, in his study of the U.S. Army’s topographical engineers
wrote about the “importance of viewing exploration as activity rather than
sequence.” Fort Bascom supports this idea. By merely existing, this post disrupted the economic lifeline that tethered the mountain and plains people
together despite being unable to sever this thriving trade.58
Victory in occupied territory is often acquired only through a war of
attrition—a slow, debilitating process where neither side can rely on body
counts to determine the winner. Such a war gave the U.S. soldiers time to
learn about the environment and the foe. Prior to 1874, the activity of doing so
was more important for the troops than any single battle they fought. Carson’s
defeat at Adobe Walls in 1864 informed everyone within the Department of
New Mexico and the U.S. Army of their weaknesses and the Natives’ strengths.
A decade passed after Carson’s foray into the Texas Panhandle before the army
fully controlled the region. Fort Bascom remained active until this occurred.
In the latter part of the 1860s, the word that best characterized the
people of the Canadian River Valley was displacement. Forts built between
long-established trade routes disrupted and altered generational relationships that had developed between the Puebloans, Nuevomexicanos, and
Plains Indians. Not surprisingly, this trade, woven into the fabric of the
region’s economy, was difficult for the U.S. Army to eliminate. Additionally, Carleton’s plans to create an agricultural oasis at the Bosque Redondo
exacerbated problems between soldiers and southern Plains Indians. An
ill-conceived disaster, its failure injected thousands of Navajos and a few
hundred Mescaleros among the comancheros and U.S. soldiers, creating a
cross-cultural nightmare of displacement. The American notion that landscape, like the indigenous cultures found west of the Mississippi River, could
be mastered with the right dose of ingenuity and power largely caused this
social tragedy. Since this was what many of the officers residing in Santa
Fe believed, they tried to implement the policy across the New Mexican
frontier. Upon arrival at Fort Bascom, soldiers were not so sure, but quickly
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realized their surroundings would be no easier to conquer than the people
they found there.
Over time, they endured the harsh landscape, which bled into their character. Fort Bascom soldiers came to know the great comanchero rendezvous sites
and could even pinpoint where the Comanches liked to winter their horses.
They knew the location of the streams that cut across the Llano Estacado and
spring-fed creeks that bubbled out of the eroded plains of eastern New Mexico.
Both cavalry and infantry, regular army and volunteers, operated out of this post
for twelve years, accumulating little notice, but maintaining, at the very least,
key positions along heavily traveled conduits that funneled powder, weaponry,
and food to the Comanches and comancheros. The impact of disrupting this
trade is hard to gauge, yet must be acknowledged. The mundane routine of
continual cavalry patrols along the many paths that cut across the Canadian
River altered the Indians’ ability to acquire military goods and foodstuffs.
Boots on the ground mattered. The information Fort Bascom soldiers accumulated on the environment and their worthy adversaries was transferred
throughout the military districts. The Fourth Cavalry and many other units
were able to draw on the experiences and subsequent reports written by the
soldiers of Fort Bascom. Regardless of whether they were gained from a
defeat, victory, or just getting lost, such experiences helped the U.S. Army
gain control of the Southwest in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.59
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